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OPINION*
____________
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.
This case is about timing – bad timing and prolonged timing – for two Liberian
nationals, lawfully present in the United States. Those men, Fombah Sirleaf and Stanley
Summerville, were loading suitcases in a vehicle at a New Jersey outlet mall parking lot
while a drug deal took place one lane over. Law enforcement officers detained them for
roughly 90 minutes in connection with that crime, which they did not commit.
Based on the apprehension itself as well as its duration, Sirleaf and Summerville
sued several officers individually under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating their Fourth
Amendment rights. The District Court had federal-question and civil-rights jurisdiction

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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over their claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. After discovery, the officers moved for
summary judgment and invoked qualified immunity. The District Court granted many
aspects of the officers’ motion but denied qualified immunity to the officer overseeing
the investigation, Detective Michael Gregory.
Through this interlocutory appeal, Detective Gregory challenges that order
denying him qualified immunity. As explained below, qualified immunity excuses
Detective Gregory for his role in the initial stop and two segments of the 90-minute
detention, but more specific findings are necessary regarding the middle 30 or so minutes
of that time period. Thus, we will reverse in part and vacate and remand in part the
District Court’s order.
I.
On October 21, 2014, a team of New Jersey law enforcement officers were
pursuing a lead from a confidential source about a heroin transaction. Officers surveilled
and followed the suspect, Richard Parker, who was driving a white Lexus, from his work
to his home, and eventually to an outlet mall, where he parked in a crowded lot.
At the same time, in the same parking lot, about thirty feet away, across the
driving lane, were Sirleaf and Summerville. They were outside of a black Mercedes SUV
loading suitcases with several objects. Those actions caught the attention of the eightmember team of law enforcement officers who were monitoring Parker. No one on that
team noticed any communications, however, between Parker and Sirleaf or Summerville.
But Parker was communicating with someone in the parking lot. An occupant
from the car next to his entered the Lexus for about 20 seconds, exited, and drove off.
3

Shortly afterwards, Parker started to drive away, and Detective Gregory then ordered that
everyone remaining on the scene – Parker, Sirleaf, and Summerville – be detained. In
searching Parker’s car, officers found a duffle bag with 200 bricks of heroin and $1,400
cash. Officers also approached Sirleaf and Summerville on foot with guns drawn and
ordered them to lie down on the ground. Officers frisked them for weapons, handcuffed
them, and questioned them for about ten minutes regarding Parker and the drug deal.
But as the officers learned, Sirleaf and Summerville had nothing to do with the
drug deal. Sirleaf explained to the officers that he arrived from Liberia the day before,
was the director of the national law enforcement organization there, had traveled to the
United States to look at military equipment, and had assisted United States law
enforcement in the past. Both Sirleaf and Summerville described that they were packing
suitcases with a large volume of over-the-counter drugs to transport to Liberia to assist
with the Ebola outbreak. The officers requested to search the car, and Summerville
consented. By the time that search was completed and yielded nothing suspicious, Sirleaf
and Summerville had been detained over 30 minutes.
Detective Gregory then went with another officer to the mall security office to
review surveillance video footage to confirm Sirleaf and Summerville were not involved
with Parker. That venture took approximately 30 minutes, but afterwards Detective
Gregory was convinced that Summerville and Sirleaf were not involved in any narcotics
transaction. He then instructed the officers on the scene that they could release Sirleaf
and Summerville if they had no further reason to detain them.
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At that point, one of the officers on the scene, Detective Marc Friedenberger, who
has not been sued in this case, continued to detain Sirleaf and Summerville. He did so to
call the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force to verify Sirleaf’s story regarding his
citizenship and occupation given at the initial questioning. That 30-minute inquiry
produced nothing irregular. With that information, and after 90 minutes of detention, the
officers released Sirleaf and Summerville.
II.
Section 1983 permits suits against persons acting under color of state law for
violating federal rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The doctrine of qualified immunity
insulates individual-capacity defendants from § 1983 liability in two potentially
overlapping instances: when their challenged actions do not violate a federal right and
when such a right is not clearly established. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003,
2007 (2017); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). A denial of qualified
immunity – to the extent it is premised on an issue of law – is immediately reviewable on
appeal under the collateral order doctrine. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530
(1985) (“[A] district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it
turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 . . . .”). Through this timely interlocutory appeal, Detective Gregory challenges
two legal aspects of the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity: that neither the
initial detention nor its length violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that for a constitutional right to be clearly
established, it must be defined with a high degree of specificity. See District of Columbia
5

v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per
curiam). A clearly established right “must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v.
Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In some contexts, such as excessive force claims, where the constitutional right
depends heavily on circumstances, see, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989); Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997), the degree of specificity
must be greater to ensure that only plainly incompetent law enforcement officers and
those who knowingly violate the law are excluded from qualified immunity. See City of
Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam); Kisela v. Hughes,
138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam); El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 336
(2020).
A violation of Fourth Amendment rights related to a detention, although still
highly dependent on circumstances, does not hinge on the same degree of factual detail as
other Fourth Amendment violations. It is clearly established that law enforcement
officers may briefly detain a person if they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 452 (3d Cir. 2010).
That standard is objective (based on a reasonable officer) not subjective (based on the
specific officer). See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). In assessing the
reasonableness of the detention, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, but
“[a]n individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not
6

enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a
crime.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Similarly, it is clearly established that, although
several factors bear on the constitutionality of a detention’s duration, officers must act
with reasonable diligence and may not unreasonably delay in confirming or dispelling
their suspicions of criminal activity. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686
(1985) (explaining that police must diligently investigate to “confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly”); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983)
(accounting for “whether the police diligently pursue[d] their investigation” in assessing
the length of the detention); Johnson, 592 F.3d at 452 (evaluating “whether the manner in
which the stop conducted was ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20)).
A. The Basis for the Detention
The initial detention of Sirleaf and Summerville did not violate their clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights. Evaluated objectively, Detective Gregory had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain them. As a matter of law, such a suspicion
could not arise merely because the men were nearby a suspected drug deal. See
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. But here, their actions – loading and unloading suitcases
outside of a car – were consistent with them having a role in that nearby drug transaction,
either as participants or as look-outs. The open factual issue identified by the District
Court – whether Detective Gregory knew that a hand-to-hand drug deal actually took
place – does not prevent that conclusion. Due to Sirleaf and Summerville’s proximity to
a suspected drug deal and their unusual activity consistent with involvement in that
7

undertaking, a reasonable, articulable suspicion existed with or without the additional
knowledge that a drug deal had transpired. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 29–31 (holding
that a brief stop-and-frisk did not violate the Fourth Amendment – even without the
officer’s knowledge that a crime had actually been committed). Thus, as a matter of law,
the initial stop did not violate Sirleaf or Summerville’s clearly established Fourth
Amendment rights.
B. The Length of the Detention
Sirleaf and Summerville also sued Detective Gregory for the overall length of the
detention. Although 90 minutes is a long time for a ‘brief’ stop, Detective Gregory
contends that precedent does not clearly establish that 90 minutes is categorically too
long. If the analysis consisted of only that consideration, then Detective Gregory would
be correct, as precedent does not clearly establish a hard cut-off time of 90 minutes (or
less) for a brief detention. But the constitutionality of a detention’s duration also depends
on officer diligence. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685–86; Place, 462 U.S. at 709. And it is
clearly established that an officer may not delay a stop to conduct an investigative
function if, through reasonable diligence, that task could have been performed earlier in
the detention. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685–86; Place, 462 U.S. at 709. To evaluate
officer diligence, the 90-minute stop can be trisected into intervals of approximately 30
minutes.
Detective Gregory merits qualified immunity for the first approximately 30
minutes of the detention. In that time, the officers secured Summerville and Sirleaf,
questioned them, and then conducted a consented-to vehicle search. Because those tasks
8

were not unduly delayed, the first third of the detention was not unreasonable, and the
District Court erred in denying qualified immunity to Detective Gregory for that portion
of the stop.
But after completion of those tasks, officers continued to detain Summerville and
Sirleaf while Detective Gregory and another officer went to the mall security office to
view a parking lot surveillance video. Detaining a suspect to review surveillance video is
not categorically unreasonable. But here, that undertaking did not begin until 30 minutes
into the stop, and the District Court found that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
that task could have been performed sooner. See Summerville v. Gregory, 2019 WL
4072494, at *16 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2019) (“This record does not suggest any reason that
this multi-officer team could not have checked the surveillance video . . . while Sirleaf
and Summerville were being questioned.”). But critically, the District Court did not
make a specific finding as to Detective Gregory’s personal involvement in that aspect of
the delay. See Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 126 (3d Cir. 1996) (requiring
courts to “analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of
each individual [officer]”). Although a narrow, limited record review may occur on
interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity, if it would be too cumbersome,
this Court may vacate the order denying qualified immunity and remand for such
findings. See Williams v. City of York, 967 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2020). And here, it is
too cumbersome to examine Detective Gregory’s personal involvement in the delayed
review of the surveillance video. A preliminary review suggests that, on the one hand,
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Detective Gregory was in charge of the investigation,1 but, on the other hand, he may
have been instructed by a more senior officer on site to review the surveillance video.2
Perhaps those differing accounts can be reconciled, but that task awaits the District Court
on remand. And if on remand, the District Court finds that Gregory had the requisite
personal involvement, it must still assess whether a reasonable officer with the
information available to Gregory would have checked the video simultaneously with the
questioning, and that determination may depend on when information became available
to Gregory.3 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (explaining that
objective reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment “will often require examination of
the information possessed by the searching officials”).

1

See, e.g., Friedenberger Depo. (JA193) (testimony from an officer on the scene that
Gregory was the “trooper in charge”); Harrison Depo. (JA553 & 556) (testimony from
the highest-ranking officer on location that Gregory was in charge of the investigation
and that “[h]e was calling the shots”); Ciano Depo. (JA568) (testimony from a higherranking officer on site that Gregory was “the supervisor, the case agent for that
investigation.”).
See, e.g., Gregory Certification ¶ 19 (JA154) (stating that he was “directed” by a higher
ranked officer on location, Detective Sergeant First Class Peter Ciano, “to proceed to the
Mall’s security office to check any surveillance video that could confirm or further dispel
any suspicion that [Sirleaf and Summerville] were involved with Parker.”); Ciano Depo.
(JA165) (testimony from Ciano that he “instructed Gregory and [another officer] to watch
the video . . . [to] make sure that [Sirleaf and Summerville] were involved”). Compare
Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts ¶ 53 (JA87) (stating that “[a]t the direction of
[Detective Sergeant] Ciano, Detective[] Gregory and [the other officer] went to the
Mall’s Security office to review security camera footage”), with Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’
Statement of Material Facts ¶ 53 (JA316) (admitting that statement and including
supplemental facts about information that Gregory learned from reviewing the video).
2

3

Cf. Ciano Depo. (JA165) (testimony from Ciano explaining that he instructed Gregory
to watch the surveillance video because he had “done several jobs in the mall” and knew
that it had a “good surveillance system.”).
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The final third of the stop involves the most delayed inquiry – the detention of
Sirleaf and Summerville pending verification with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force.
The District Court did not make a specific finding of Detective Gregory’s personal
involvement in that detention. But for that aspect of his involvement, review of the
record is not too cumbersome. See Williams, 967 F.3d at 258. After watching the
surveillance video, Detective Gregory telecommunicated to the officers on the scene that
Sirleaf and Summerville were free to go (unless the officers had, in the interim,
discovered a reason to detain them). Upon receiving that message, Detective
Friedenberger decided to continue the detention while he checked with the Joint
Terrorism Task Force. Although nothing in the record justifies such a delay in initiating
that inquiry, nothing in clearly established law subjects Detective Gregory to liability
after he gave the order to release Sirleaf and Summerville.4 To the contrary, it is
generally understood that supervisors cannot be liable for violating a constitutional right
absent their personal involvement in the wrongdoing. See Baraka v. McGreevey,
481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and [he or she] cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor
approved.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Rode v. Dellarciprete,

To be clear, nothing about this ruling necessarily condones Detective Friedenberger’s
decision to further prolong the stop; the basis for reversing is that without Detective
Gregory’s personal involvement in the final 30 minutes of the detention, his conduct did
not violate clearly established law.
4
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845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights case must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the
operation of respondeat superior.”).5 Accordingly, the District Court erred in denying
qualified immunity to Detective Gregory for the final approximately 30 minutes of the
detention.
* * *
For these reasons, we reverse in part and vacate and remand in part the District
Court’s denial of qualified immunity to Detective Gregory. He is entitled to qualified
immunity for the decision to detain Sirleaf and Summerville as well as for the first 30
minutes and final 30 minutes of the 90-minute detention. But for the middle 30 or so
minutes of the stop, we vacate and remand for factual findings regarding Detective
Gregory’s personal involvement in the delay.

5

See also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017) (explaining that a Bivens claim
– the federal analog to § 1983 suits against persons acting under color of state law – “is
brought against the individual official for his or her own acts, not the acts of others”);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (explaining in the Bivens context that
“[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is
only liable for his or her own misconduct”).
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